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of performance is  in i ts e lf  an impossibility, but I have done my best 
and can only plead in mitigation the words of Aristotle;
"A plausible im poss ib ility  is always preferable to an unconvincing 
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The dissertation at f irs t  examines the i c & t i o n & ,e f
im p oss ib ility  o f performance in  Roman law and very b r ie f ly  traces S i  
h is to rica l evolution o f these princip les in  medieval times and in  S #  
Roman-Dutch law period, with a view to providing a background against 
which the modern South African law on the topic cm b© sxaitlnsd
Thereafter a chapter follows in  which the relevance o f fore ign law to 
an understanding of the South African law on the eubject 1* examined.
This is  p a rticu la rly  necessary in  view o f the fa c t that
(a) English decisions have been referred to and even applied by 
our courts, p a rticu la rly  p r io r  to 1919;
(b) certain judgments of our courts, beginning with the case of
fW m m  6 Go u &)R *W  AWddpaM*? 1919 AD 427, 
contain statements on the applicability of English law which 
are net easy to understand or to reconcile;
(c) certain judgments of our courts, more particularly the 
judgment in Aealty fmwt l td  *  &>%**# 1922 AD 389, 
refer to Continental European writers, and In the ligh t o f
th e ir works make certa in statements, a lb e it o H ts r ,  about 
our law.
In the remainder o f the d isserta tion  1 exsmna and mke a case fo r 
certain view* on the present-day South African legal position concerning 
supervening impossibility of performs'C@, In particular, the 
dfsa@f&&tion deals with
(a) the supervening event having to bs one tha t fa lls  Into the 
category o f a m $m  fo rU d tm  or a v is  major, and what exactly 
the scope o f each of mese concepts 1s, re fe rring  especia lly 
to the fo rse ea b ility  o f the event;
(b) idle causal connection between the *%#%* y&rwttwa or vt* awjiq 
and the inab ility  of the debtor.to perform, and particularly 
the effect of fau lt (whether dblw* or ewZpa) or the mra o f
e ith e r party or the operation of the maxim genus non p®v»v. 
in this regard; also the ned for the impossibility to be
absolute; the e ffe c t o f the surrounding circumstances and a 
correct appreciation of the contract in determining whether 
the s itua tion  is  indeed ode of # # i:U te  im poss ib iH #  :e 
performance; and whether there is any place in our law fo r a 
doctrine o f "commercial im p o ss ib ility ";
the question whether there is  an ob liga tion on the debtor to 
n o tify  the c red ito r o f the occurrence o f the supervening 
event; the possible application o f the princip les o f estoppel 
in  these circumstances; and the possible consequences o f a 
fa ilu re  to n o tify ;
the e ffe c t o f p a rtia l im p oss ib ility  o f performance, p a rtic u la r ly  
whether substantial performance is  s u ff ic ie n t,  the 
seve rab ility  o f obligations to perform and the consequent 
rights of the parties;
the d is tin c tio n  between partial and temporary im poss ib ility  
o f performance and the crucial nature o f th is  d is tin c tio n ;
the e ffec t o f temporary im p oss ib ility  o f performance, and a 
c r it ic a l appraisal of B am tta  v R M sts ia  MsdUxeye 1947 (E)
SA 1075 (SR);
the e ffe c t o f supervening im p oss ib ility  o f performance, 
p a rtic u la r ly  in  re la tion  to the question whether m odification 
o f the contract is possible, the termination o f the 
obligations under the contract and the exceptional circumstances 
when th is does not occur, both a t common law and by s ta tu te , 
the e ffec t on rights acquired under the contract and the 
remedies available to the parties, the e ffe c t o f spec ific  
terms in the contract, such as a m sfs tvv fs  clause and an 
exemption clause;
the question o f pleading and onus o f proof in  actions 
involving supervening im p oss ib ility  o f performance.
CHAPTER 1
A, Scope o f the Inquiry
The object o f th is  d isserta tion is  an analysis o f the law 
re la ting  to supervening im p oss ib ility  o f performance of 
contract in  South A frica and a statement o f the princip les 
applicable in  as much de ta il and as accurately as possible.
In order fo r  th is  to be done reference w il l  have to be made 
to legal sources, and this w ill pose the f irs t  major problem.
In the past, our courts re lied  upon English cases as se tting  
out rules and principles applicable in our own law or at least 
as providing guidance to us when confronted with d i f f ic u l t  
problems where l i t t l e  or no assistance is available from the 
tra d itio n a l South African law sources. To some extent th is  
recourse to English law takes place today. I sh a ll, therefore, 
f i r s t  have to establish whether a reliance upon English law 
sources is  permissible and advisable, and i f  so, to what ex­
ten t. The same question w i l l  also have to  be asked of other 
foreign-law sources* Such an enquiry necessarily involves a 
reasonable working knowledge not only o f the foreign legal 
system being examined but also o f our own legal system, in  
order to ascertain whether and to  what extent the princip les 
of the two legal systems and the approach of the courts in  
each of them are comparable and consonant. This o f necessity 
involves a p rio r knowledge o f the very subject o f the main 
enquiry - the South African law re la ting  to supervening 
impoaaibility of performance of contract, which obviously makes 
i t  d i f f ic u l t  to discuss the relevant topics in w atertigh t 
compartments* Inevitably, then, there w ill be a good deal of 
cross-referencing, and, in  p a rt ic u la r , in i t ia l  consideration 
of topics that are to be examined in  more de ta il la te r .
This work is not, however* primarily a comparative*1aw study;
the treatment o f comparative aspects w i l l  be kept to a 
minimum, and, so fa r as is possible and practicable, confined
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This work is  not, however, prim arily  a comparative-law study, 
the treatment o f comparative aspects w i l l  be kept to a 
minimum, and, so fa r  as is possible and practicable, confined
to the particular legal principle of our law under examination.
B, C lass ifica tion  o f Types of  Impossibi 1 i t y
In conventional legal terminology, a contract may be unilateral, 
in the sense that an obligation to make performance (m  the 
widest connotation) is imposed on one party only ( fo r  instan , 
a contract of donation); or i t  may be bilateral (or multi­
la te ra l), in the sense that, from the time the contract comes 
into being, obligations are imposed on both parties (or i f  
there are more than two p a rtie s , on a l l p a rtie s ), each being 
both debtor (promisor) and creditor (promisee). The vast 
majority of contracts are bilateral (m ultilateral) (for 
instance, sale, letting and hiring of property, the various 
types of contracts of service). I t  is common in c iv il4aw  
countries to draw a distinction between a synallagmatic 
bilateral (m ultilateral) contract - sometinv: called a 
reciprocal contract - and a non-sync( agmat. one. Where t  e 
contract is synallagmatic the oblige ,,ns to make performance 
are undertaken each as an equivalent return for the other, as 
in sale and in letting and hiring, though the duty of each o 
perform is not necessarily at the same time. Where i t  is 
non-synallagmatic, for instance, where i t  is loan of money, 
th is  is not so, The d is tin c tio n  is significant because a 
synallagmatic contract may yield the defendant the so-called 
defence of emaeptdo moM adKmp&eK eontraatw*.
I f *  at the time the contract is entered into, i t  is impossible 
for one of the contracting parties to perform or to desist or 
abstain from doing the act ha has contracted to do or not to 
do, then the contract may vary well be regarded in law as 
in it ia lly  impossible of performance. On the other hand,it
might not. For example, i f  I agree to pay you R20 000 
w ith in  seven days fo r, say, goods sold and delivered, but, 
unknown to me, the stock-market has slumped and I am a ruined 
man, and even at the time I enter in to  the contract steps 
are being taken to sequestrate my estate so that I am to ta l ly  
unable to pay you the R20 000 as promised, nevertheless the 
contract w i l l  not be regarded in  law as in i t ia l ly  impossible 
of performance. This is  because the law does not regard mere 
personal in a b il i ty  to perform as constitu ting  im p o ss ib ility .
Conversely, I may have agreed to s e ll and transfe r a certain 
piece o f land to you, but unknown to me you happen to be a 
d isqua lified  person in  terms o f the Group Areas Act, so th a t, 
although I could physically transfe r the property in to  your 
name, the law w i l l  not allow i t .  Here the law would regard 
the contract as in i t ia l l y  impossible o f performance, as 
lo g ic a lly  i t  should also be i f  I agreed not to do something 
I was lega lly  obliged to do, such as not to feed my in fa n t 
ch ild  fo r a week, though such contracts are usually dealt 
w ith under the heading o f i l le g a l contracts, That they can 
also be regarded as in it ia l ly  impossible of performance can 
be illustrated by considering contracts to refrain from doing 
something which i t  is not physically or natura lly  possible to  
avoid, such as a promise not to d ie, which, besides being 
absurd, is  also not possible to a tta in  in  the lig h t o f 
s c ie n t if ic  knowledge up to the present time,
In the case o f supervening im p oss ib ility  o f performance the 
question of impossibility is regarded in much the same way, 
except that here the obligation or obligations is or were 
possible of performance at the time the contract was entered 
in to but subsequently, and before performance had been made, 
became impossible to f u l f i l ,  Here, again* physical impossi* 
b ility  per se is not enough* because on the one hand i t  may 
be personal to the one liable to perform (the debtor),which* 
as I shall show, la te r , my not excuse him from l ia b i l i t y ,
On the other hand, performance may be prohibited by law or be
oontva honos mores,when i t  w il l  be lega lly  excused even 
though physically possible. The legal grounds of supervening 
impossibi 11 ty o f performance w i l l  be examined at greater .
ipnnt.h later in  th is  dissertation.
contra  bonos morse,when i t  w i l l  be le ga lly  excused even 
though nhysically possible. The legal grounds o f supervening 
im poss ib ility  of performance w i l l  be ex ami ned at greater 
length la te r in th is  d isserta tion .
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT Of SUPERVENING
IMPOSEIBILITY Of PERFORMANCE
A. Roman Law
When i t  becomes apparent tha t a party to a contract is  unable 
to perform one or more of his obligations under that contract, 
the f i r s t  question we as lawyers ask ourselves is whether 
the impossibility of performance existed at the time when the 
contract was entered in to  or whether i t  came in to  being 
subsequently, the former being termed in i t ia l  im poss ib ility  
of performance and the la tte r supervening impossibility of 
performance. This is the f irs t  major classification which 
our law makes, and i t  is  one which is  also made in  other legal 
systems, being a tra d itio n a l as well as a logical separation 
o f the two kinds of im poss ib ility  handed down to us from
Roman law.
Roman law employed the word dmposfkbftft&e only in connection
with in i t ia l  im p o s s ib ility J  For supervening im poss ib ility  
i t  used the word (which in  th is  context means an
accident or chance occurence).
Roman law divided contracts into those which were a t r ia #
and those which were bona f id H i  according to the forms
1
Hoot'd, Enk6l6 HUtorischs Rsntteksmngsn," fflio?its6r«ie*M2 
ttegm ijn  TMmda 1972 (Amsterdam) 493 at 497,
mm ObUgcttiomramht. fBraumchwetg, 1863) vol I
f c S M / s  - r e s . " ™ ' » * - *
Varlag, Aalen, 1963 , reprint),
of action which, in  terms o f the rules o f c iv i l  procedure, 
were available to parties seeking to enforce contractual 
r ig h ts . Some contracts, such as s r ip u la t io , were s t r i c t i  , , ^
ju r is  . They comprised the older system o f # # r # e t# T  ; v  
ob ligations, a l l the contracts in  th is  class being u n ila te ra l. 
The la te r  system o f contractual obligations was borne 
and the contracts in th is  class were generally b ila te ra l.
S t r ic t i  ju r is  actions could l ie  fo r a cevtum or could be 
brought with the formula in o s r ta f> In both cases the judgWht 
had to consist in  the award o f a de fin ite  sum o f money {eon- 
dermatic p e c u n ia r ia )^  fo r  u n til the in troduction o f the 
esstraordinaria aogn itio  procedure the Roman courts had no 
power to order spec ific  performance/  They had to content 
themselves w ith attempting to compel spec ific  performance 
in d ire c tly  by making the ju d ic ia l assessment (% iti§  
payable in  the case o f nor-performance so high tha t i t  was 
in  the judgment debtor's in terests to make the performance 
promised rather than to "buy i t  o ff"  by paying the sum 
awarded (omdemiatio p m m ia r ia ) .
The judgment, however, could be and was always sa tis fie d  by 
payment of the sum awarded.9 Hence, s t r ic t ly  speaking, i t  
should have been irre le va n t whether actual performance was 
possible, fo r the Romans, like  us, never regarded mere 
in a b il i ty  to pay as amounting to im poss ib ility  o f performance,
3, Buck!and op a i t  1281.
4, Whether oertwm dor* or aertm
5, Max Kiser Roman P riva te  LaJ 2 ed (Durban,1968) I I  I  34.
(trans la tion  by Rolf Dannenburg of the 3rd ed ition  o f.
ZW va&reaht.)
6, Kaser op a i t  2 ed I I  1 34.
7, See J M Kelly ftomn L it ig a t io n  (Oxford 1966) 69 f,
8, fb id .  See also Kaser op a i t  2 ed I I  I  34.
9, Dietgr Medicus "Zur Funktion der Leistungsunmoglichkeit 
1m romischen Recht" 1969
f u r  Reahtsgmahiahte LXXXVI Band (Rom Abb) 67 a t 92, 102-3.
whether in  the sense of im poasib iU tas  or of oasus. I t  is 
therefore d iff ic u lt  to see why impossibility of performance, 
whether in it ia l or supervening, came to be regarded as an 
excusing factor,11 particularly in actions with a formula 
im & H a , where the judge was instructed to condemn the ^  
defendant in whatever he ought to perform to the p la in tiff,
Ernst RabeV3 has pointed to certa in factors wnich he feels 
have played a role in  the development o f in i t ia l  im p oss ib ility  
o f performance, v iz  the considerations o f fraud, je s t,  
donation, error, fau lt, public policy (ie the application of 
the am tm  moms rule) and lack of pecuniary damage.
The la s t two could equally apply to supervening im poss ib ility  
o f performance, Dieter Medicus^ stresses a fu rthe r fac to r, 
viz the practical d ifficu lty  of estimating in litig a tion  t,:e 
value o f a non-existent res in  early times, probably (as i t  
was not always easy to get the defendant into court) a con­
siderable time after i t  had ceased to exist, The performance 
hod to be capable of evaluation in terms of money, and i f  
no re lia b le  estimate could be arrived a t, no action could be
gi van,
Whatever the reasons that led to the development of the rules,
11, Medicus '•p a i t  73,
12, Kaser op a i t  32 I I  5,
1 3 , GrwMdawp* r& t'eo W  PHwetreokta (1915) 6 77, referred
to by Medicus op a i t  a t 80,
14, See also Ga,i In s t itu t io n s b 3 97, 97c and 99,
15 , op avt 80,
16. See Kaser op a i t  2 ed I I  34.
"■au Romans recognised that im p oss ib ility  o f performance, 
whether in i t ia l  or supervening, would absolve a promisor from 
'ds duty to perform, though the rule was applied d iffe re n tly  
'o each of these two types of impossibility,
. lit releasing e ffe c t o f su{, ■ ening im poss ib ility  o f performance 
appears to have been applied to s tipu la tions at a fa ir ly  early 
date, thus, i f  A promised to give B a spec ific  re s , which 
was accidentally destroyed before i t  was due to be handed 
over to 8, A was released from his obligation to give i t  to 
3 and did not have to  pay B the value o f the r@s.
Since business transactions are usually b ila te ra l, in the
older system o f Roman law parties frequently gave reciprocal 
stipulations.17 The question now arises, what would the 
position be i f  only one o f the s tipu la to rs  found that, through 
no fa u lt  o f his own but because of casus, i t  was impossible 
fo r  him to f u l f i l  his stipu la ted promise? in such cases 
whether the counte r-s tipu la tor had done anything in fu lfilm e n t 
Jf hi% own stipulation or not, the stipulator would be 
released from his obligation, provided that the impossibility 
•i’liB not due to his fa u lt ;  but there !s no clear answer in the 
'.--■crly Roman law to  the question whether the counte r-s tipu la tor 
was released from his reciprocal obligation i f  he had not 
performed, or, i f  he had performed, whether he could recover 
what he had already given, The only text which at f irs t  
glance appear* to be relevant is 4 12.7.1, which reads:
"Whether the promise was made without consideration in the 
beginning or was made in  consideration of a promise which has 
terminated* or fa iled , to take effect, a ocvtcMotto wil l  l ie  
for the recovery of anything paid under 1t"J9 but, as
Auckland “Cavue and Frustration in  Roman and Common Law" op o i t  
"Unro uses the word "exhausted",
Buckland points out*^  "that refers merely to non-performance 
and should not be confused with release by oaewe," I t  would
seem that the other party would s t i l l  be bound, and there Is 
no indication tha t an equitable release, whether by eecaeptio 
d o li or otherwise, was applicable. The release was only of 
the party whose obligation had become Impossible o f performan 
and nothing more,
The question whether release of one party by gobum would 
absolve the other o f his duty to perform his reciprocal 
obligation arose directly in the case of the aondWatto***,
p a rtic u la r ly  the cond’Cotio ob v@m d a t i , or aond'ictio aaufio 
data cxzubcc non seowtxz as i t  was known to Justin ian,
In classical Roman law only certain kinds of agreement were
le ga lly  enforceable. A contract which did not f a l l  into one 
o f the recognised legal categories, such as a contract for 
mutual services, exchange or a s im ila r transaction, was 
incapable of being enforced, and i f  one party had performc 
he had no means of compelling counter-performance by the 
other, To alleviate the injustice thus occasioned, the 
c iv i l  law provided the oondia tio  ob rem d a ti to enable the 
party a t least to recover what he had given under the 
unenforceable contract, thus creating a unilateral obllgatic: 
to perform analogous to that under e t ip u la t io .*  And, as 
Buckland points out, "we should thus expect here, as there, 
however u n fa ir i t  may appear, oasur, would relieve the receiv 
o f his ob liga tion to perform what he had promised under the 
unenforceable contract, "and, since this was release and no 
more, the receiver would be under no ob liga tion to  res to r :, 
what had been received. And so i t  is laid down in v tn n
20, Buckland "Cae** and Frustrate:, :
texts ,"23
Thus in B 12.4.3, i t  is p ro v id e d S g ff  1 y e e  to perform' '  
a certain obligation in your fa v a * i f  you fo r W  psrt »11  
manumit a certain slave, W  the slave dies through no fau lt  
of yours before I have performed, you may nevertheless bring
an action to compel performance.
There are texts to the contrary ( fo r  example D 12.4,16 ) and 
even texts where disagreement on the point is  adverted to 
(for example, that between Celsius p a f -  and fftfwB'gg between 
Aristo and Celsus# and between Juli : Mauri clan ) ,  but 
the contrary texts?? mostly relate to the promise of a dbe 
where the marriage his since become impossible (in  which 
equitable solutions are common) or to donatio 6*b modo (in  
which generally the transfer of the property donated is 
conditional).?& As Buckland points out: "The weight of the
te x ts , a t least in  commercial cases, is  heavily against
23. Idem.
24, Id#m 1283 n!2,
(Hamburg 1965) 14.
26. Idem.
" ip S iiif
im poss ib ility  at a l l ,
Iwra 6 at 12,
recovery from the recipient of performance upon release by
AMcKotto ob ram and that equitable re h e f wa
sporadically applied, and then generally in nrn-commercial
31 cases.
The position was otherwise in the later borwzfidsi 
although the same rule was applied with equal rigour. a 
in Roman Law was essentially unilateral in its  effect 
both parties are relieved by casus, i t  is only where J 3  
casus makes both performances impossible. That the other 
party is also released in most bom f i d *  contracts res s _
not upon release by casus, but on the. very differen pn
that L  A d . bona a party ought not to be called upon to pay 
for a service he has not had"32 or, i f  he had already paid, 
that he ought to recover anything paid for the performance 
which had become impossible.33 Bern in Roman law was
not merely restricted to absence of fraud. I t  even wen 
beyond requiring each party to do a ll that is 
fu lf i l  the purpose of the contract and to refrain from d g
anything which would defeat or nuliny that purpose. Each 
+n wn what he can to fu lf i l  the reasonable
31.
WSMmsM-
(op adt 86)'
expectations of the other contracting party.34 The development 
of the concept of bom fid@s seems to have been accompame 
by and probably connected with a dawning realisation of the 
mutually interdependent nature of performance and counter­
performance, certainly in some of the newer, consensual 
contracts that had come into being.
aymZtaem is a useful modern term employed to describe this 
mutual interdependence of reciprocal obligations.  ^ I t  was 
originally a Greek word with a very wide and indefinite 
area of meaning,^ and although i t  was used by the Roman 
jurists Labeo and Aristo i t  was not used by them in the more 
restricted and specialised sense found here. Nevertheless 
the synallagmatic nature of certain contracts, notably 
kwatda # ^ * 6 ,  and uendKKo, cams to
be recognized and enforced by the Romans ever more as time 
went by, although retarded by the shortcomings of the 
procedural remedies available.
A modern w rite r^  has classified syW W m s ihto three types -  
genetic aymlWma (which is to the effect that i f  one 
obligation does not coma into being then the counter-obligation 
w ill not be created), conditional symZZagma (where one 
obligation expires, the counter-obligation wil l  also disappear) 
and functional spm llugm  ( i f  the fulfilment of one
E S S  2 7 S , S , S S S S ;  S . t X S ' S
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obligation is demanded, then the counter-obligation has to be
s a t is f ie d ) . 4^  '"Genetic s y m lla g m  would appear to relate 
exclusively to i n i t i a l  im possib il ity  and cases where there 
has been an in it ia l failure of contract, and so does not 
concern this work. I t  is p r inc ipa lly  in to  the f ie ld  of  ^  ^
conditional symllccgtnz that cases on supervening im poss ib il ity  
o f performance f a l l .  The analysis, however, though in teresting, 
is not of much importance to th is work. I t  w i l l  be s u f f ic ie n t  
, Say that as a resu lt of the growing importance o f the 
notion of horn f& W  there gradually developed a concept ih 
classical times41 that performance and counter-performance 
were, subject to certain exceptions, interdependent.
This was pa rt icu la r ly  so in  the newer, consensual contracts 
aawdbotfd and ampeda where, however* a
doctrine of r isk  {p&x'iculien) evolved. The relationship 
between the doctrine of r isk  and the rules re la ting  to
impossibility of performance will be examined 
more fu l ly  la te r ,  but i t  may here be stated that i t  provided 
to the notion of whereas the
dottrfne of impossibility of performance fa l ls  w ith in  the 
cmGept of and, i t  is submitted, developed as a
p W  of i t ,
d 12.4.16 i l lu s t ra te s  the difference nea tly . in th is
Celsus imagines s situation where I give you a sum 
#  #ngy i f  you will give me the slave Stichus, According
to leTsus, th is transaction is not a sale but a case where 
t h e , a b  r## db#4 r# 8#d%&z would apply. He
then premises three possible events, the f i r s t  of which 
eonstitf tes supervening im poss ib il ity  of performance, namely
i !
40, A W  1,
41, Idem 34, 39, 45, 94, 114*
42, M m  97 and 117,
116 and 118; see also 100,
• ' .................................VM M
■ ■
#p- ,0'- . v
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that Stichus had died after the conclusion of the contract 
with you and before he has been handed over to me, and 
concludes that I would have the r ight to recover the money 
paid over to you. The express explanation that the trans­
action is not to be judged on the analogy of sale is 
important, for otherwise the rule p e r io u lm  emptoris  would 
apply and a buyer of Stichus in those circumstances would 
have no right to recover his purchase price.
In lease, also, the doctrine of risk (peviaulum) resulted 
in exceptions to the s t r ic t  mutual interdependence between 
performance and counter-performance. For example, i f  a 
tenant farmer was unable to produce a crop because of v is  
m jo v , such as floods, landslides, night fros t, excessive 
heat, or devastation by Roman or alien soldiers or by robbers^ 
or pirates, he.was excused from his obligation to pay rental. 
There was, however, no release arising from disadvantages esc 
ipsa ve-i ov ian tu r, such as the "flipping over of wine, the 
destruction of crops by insects or the choking of crops by 
weeds, because these causes of damage were regarded as 
fa l l in g  more within the tenant's sphere of influence.
The synallagm  was then forced into the background by the 
doctrine of risk in both emptio venditio  and locatio  
conduotio^ wherever that doctrine applied. As Benohr puts 
i t :  "Here a ruling is favoured which takes into account the 
financial factors in a better way than the s t r ic t  principle
43. Id®m 91,
44. Idem 106-17; see also Buckland "Casus and Frustration in Roman and
Wt%iro'f%u^rv]nfng i%pAmty o f ^ f o S e r ^
see pages 90-2 below.
45. BenShr op a i t  107, 118.
46. This included loaatio ocnduatio operarum and loca tio  
oonduatio opevis fac iend i, see Buekland "<Tctsus and 
Frustration in Roman and Common Law" op c i t  1290,
15.
Of the BVm lta g ma . 'A1 Possibly, i f  I may hazard a guess, 
commercial practice had much to do with the development of 
the doctrine of risk (particularly in sale), much as i t  has 
in modern times with the emergence of the expedition theory 
of acceptance sent through the post, and this practice no 
doubt rested to a large extent upon commercial convenience 
and acceptable public policy.
But, quite possibly, i t  also had its  roots in long-standing 
tradition, and Buckland49 has suggested that i f  sale was a 
simplification of two stipulations, as is sometimes contended, 
the fact that only the stipulator whose promise had subse­
quently become impossible of fulfilment was thereby excused 
from his obligations, whereas the counter-stipulator was not, 
might account for the exceptional rule that the risk in the 
m m  passed to the buyer even though there had been no transfer 
of ownership in the mvx to him; the rule of the old strwtJ- 
im U  reciprocal stipulations impressing its e lf  by tradition  
and usage, as i t  were, on the la ter b o m n fid n  contract of
sale,
Leaving out of account the rules of partokW , the general 
rule of Roman law, then, was that a tonoafCdbt contract
which had subsequently become impossible of performance on 
one side in effect released both parties from their duties 
to perform under i t ,  and, i f  one party had already performed 
before performance by the other became impossible, he could 
recover nis performance, or at any rate, i f  that was no 
longer possible, the enrichment gained by the other.
47 , op a i t  108 (my translation); also 117-18.
social (op a i t  108),
49. oo a i t  1281 n 5
This general rule, however, was subject to certain q u a lifi­
cations - qualifications which, because they apply to 
cams and not to the concept of bom fid e s , also app ie
contracts Q tv ia ti ju r is ;  namely
(a) the impossibility of performance must not be due to the
fault of the party whose performance has become 
impossible; and,
(b) performance must be objectively, and not merely 
subjectively,SO impossible.
Let me b r ie f ly  examine each of these in turn.
(a) Fault
As has been seen, notwithstanding the fact that in all cases 
the award had to consist of a definite sum of money, super- 
vening impossibility of performance released the debtor from 
his obligation to perform (except, of course, where the 
was in respect of oer-Sa p s e m ia ) , This was not the case ^  
where the impossibility was due to the debtor's own fau lt.
Here a distinction was made between the formula insert^and 
an action for a csrtum. Where the action was brought with a 
formula in m r ta ,  with o r  without the insertion of the phrase 
"as f id s  bom ", the culpable destruction of the object 
primarily owed did not discharge the obligation. I f  the
- ■  r : . s =  1 '■
' lillp B
(see Windscheid *4* 284 2 (a )),
52. Kaser op o i t  § 37 1 3a.
17.
debtor failed to perform properly, owing to circumstances for
=§1 I= S
55these actions.
m
53 , As to which, see below 25f.
5 4 , Kaser op at* § 37 I 3a.
55, Jdam § 37 I 3a,
' M ithe conclusion o f the contract.
57, Kaser op a-ft 3 37 I 2,
cn Ae i-n which, see la te r at 25f*
18.
destruction of bhe th ing , the cred ito r could proceed as i f
the re s  were s t i l l  in existence at the time of U U s  
ooMtestatda, so that the formulary dare opcrtar* remained 
va lid .W
Even here, of course, the judgment against the debtor was to 
pay the assessed value of the res. There was no room in 
these actions for an award of damages. I f  the object owed 
was in fact given, but in a defective condition, from the time 
of Julian the reduction in  value could be claimed by the 
s tr ic t action for dare, and the same held fo r  an incomplete 
performance. Before Julian's time the creditor was restricted 
to the aotdo dk doZo, the action for redder* being justified  
by the f ic t io n  res de t& rio r redd ita  non est redd ita .
Thus, for example, i f  I promise to give you the slave Stichus 
and then k i l l  him before handing him over, you could s t i l l  
bring your action, and I would be obliged to pay you the 
value o f  Stichus, who was kept notionally alive for this 
purpose by the q&rpetuatio   ^ which was an extension of the 
olausnla d o lt .
ju s t  how the Roman law came to develop th is doctrine in  th is  
p a rtic u la r way 1* a b i t  o f a mystery. The p*rpatwat4o 
a&WpatApMda applied only to supervening im possib ility  of
59. Kaser op o it  I  37 I 2.
60. 12?id  and D 13.6.31* 16.3.1,16>
61. Medicus op a i t  71.
62. fd*m 72, The fa u lt  did not give rise to a new obligation
even a fte r the perpetm tio  disappeared. The old > , 
obligation is preserved, the duty of Performance remaining 
le g a lly  the same, The fac t th a t a money equivalent o f
performance is exacted from the debtor is merely an
1 ,38 .3 ,
19,
,.■,4
performance,63 In i t ia l  im possib ility  o f performance seems to 
have been recognised as a ground for release from as fa r  ac 
as our sources go, without any exception s im ila r to the
Why, then, should I be free of a ll  t ia b t is ty  
i f  I f i r s t  k m  Stichus and then, knowing you are unaware 0 
that fa c t, promise him to you? Why was Stichus in  th is instance 
not to be kept no tionally  a live  for the purpose of founding 
l ia b i l i ty ?
As has been seen, the parpetwatdo obKgattfM ta was an 
extension o f the ckzwauta d b K , and, according to Medicos, 
the aZawsw&z dbZi would not only in  its  future tense re fe r  
to the subsequent destruction of the r*e  but in i ts  preeemt 
tense also to i t s  destruction before the promise, as the 
promise i t s e l f  would c o n s tib lz  i f  the promisor^had
destroyed the himself before he made the promise. In 
theory, then, the p&rpetuatio ob liga tion is  should have applied 
to in i t ia l  im possib ility  o f performance too, unless, o f 
course, the slave Stichus was a figment o f my imagination 
and had never existed a t a l l  in  factf^  _ but th is was not the
case.
I t  has been suggested th a t the reason fo r the d is tin c tio n  
may very well l ie  in  the fa c t that i t  is  supposed that under 
the Old ootdo per aeoromwMtwm in  ren procedure the r*s
or something (such as a part o f i t )  symbolising the rw* had 
to be produced^ but that cannot be so, fo r i t  would have 
applied equally in  cases o f supervening and in i t ia l  im p o s s ib ility ,
63. fcbm 74.
64. Id&tn 71,
65. Idrm 72,
66. Idem 73.
67. Kaser Das B^misohs .z iv « p w M » ttw «  (Mllnchen 1966) 69 ,
t.n bv Medicus c o i t  74.
ds has beet: ,i:OW; , ,vas s. ' the case, i t  would also 
he vs apptieo to cases of subjective and objective im poss ib il ity  
end to a promise to deliver a rss in possession o f another, 
which, as w i l l  be seen, was also not the law. As indicated 
ea r l ie r ,  Medictis submits that the real reason lies  in the 
practical d i f f ic u l t y  in f ix in g  the y£tie a e v t im t ic  in early 
^ tres . As hr puts i t :  "To exoress I t  in  positive terms, the 
pbW get&m t* re s tr ic ts  i t s e l f  to those cases in  
.'hioh the performance rss existed in a perform ance-fit state 
i: hri-'. time previously and therefore also had a real 
•t .rkct pr i ce. : t is true that in cases of im poss ib il ity  
le c 'm o t fwcic: the monetary value of the re *  I f  one takes 
i t  i t s  acltia' condition, but why draw a line  at the moment 
t! ;onfcrt.er. is ; armed? i f  Stichus had been k i l le d  moments 
he; re the s tip u la tio n  war given and you found out th is  fact 
.metrls afte r I had " t ip u la te d , how could i t  be more 
* ' f f i o c H  to arrive  a t- ifr 't  aunatim tia  than in the case of 
caret, les t a" sea after : t  is promised, where months
70
i cpi : Av ft-: r the •’ r becomes known?
"cw ititii .>n ix " the ..ts f inc tlo ii is obscure, but i t  may l ie  in 
lib d if fe ren t fine.-, along which the notions of im posB ib iliins  
and casus developed, 4n considerations o f policy such as the 
Aden that s '.ontraci: of sale must have a certain and de fin ite  
.-tibject-ffli’ttay upon which to operate, and in Roman ideas of 
"'snnnslbH i- v. wh h t need no*- examine here.
•uu vortierilnc between fau lt and accident does not appear to 
Arvo been very c learly  defined in Roman law, In the s t r ic te s t  
' ' fn: fo' instance the aotiom e ax s tip u la tU i and in
• v t s f i t ' t r  no < ' 4 - 5 .
.’ (hin
riedicus cxpUinb th is, apparently, by saying i t  is a 
"rather rough and ready c lass if ica tion  . , , not too 
rnusual in  the ^mrl.v Roman Law" (op e i t  79 - my
condietioms, th e  d e b to r  w a s , aocord't >u; to  ■ • ■ < > • ! af> *6
o n ly  in  th e  case o f  dolus,
According to the examples given in the Code, the classical 
ju r is ts  seem to have assumed a l i a b i l i t y  i f  the debtor had 
made performance impossible by his intentional act [faaeve) 
or i f  he had knowingly delayed the possible performance.
But i t  was l i a b i l i t y  fo r  dolus in  an objective sense, in 
th a t conduct was construed as intended i f ,  fo r  example, t i , - 
debtor had acted in ignorance of his obligation, and even n 
he could not have acted otherwise under the circumstances.
In isolated cases l i a b i l i t y  was extended to aulpa, but t ir  
was probably c la s s ic a lb e c a u s e  in ea r l ie r  times only 
l i a b i l i t y  fo r  dolus and l i a b i l i t y  fo r  oustodia existed in 
the f ie ld  o f contractual and quasi-contractual responsibility
L ia b il i ty  fo r okstod&z was imposed on borrowers "and, fu rther
more, on those who, lik e  the launderer { fu llo )  and the mender 
of garments (eare in o tc r), received things to be worked uton, 
the ship-master, innkeeper and stable-keeper (nauta, oaupo s t  
stdbulariuB), the lessor of a warehouse, the inspector who, 
in  his own in te res t, received things fo r examination, 
presumably also the vendor before delivery, the lessee of a 
th ing , the partner who had to work upon things belonging to  
other partners, and perhaps also the p ledge-creditor."
71 , op a i t  I  H I 4.
72, J&td. See also 1 2 .,.s.
73, Ibid 8 36 I I I  4, See also Abent# v vofewon 4 Co
AD 262, explaining Innes CJ in MacDuff Co {Liqu-idator 
o f)  v JohannsHbiorg Consolidated Investment Co,, 1924 AD 
573 and Pothier Tvaite dee O bligations  3 6 3 para 625
74, Kaser op a i t  I 36 I I I  4.
71
oondiationes, the debtor WfiSs according to Kaser> l ia b le
only in the case of dolus.
According to the examples given in the Code, the classical 
ju r is ts  seem to have assumed a l i a b i l i t y  i f  the debtor had 
made performance impossible by his intentional act 
or i f  he had knowingly delayed the possible performance.
But i t  was l i a b i l i t y  fo r dolus in  an objective sense, in 
that conduct was construed as intended i f ,  fo r example, the 
debtor had acted in ignorance of his obligation, and even i f  
he could not have acted otherwise under the circumstances.
In isolated cases l i a b i l i t y  was extended to Gulya* but th is  
was probably c la ss ica l,74 because in e a r l ie r  times only 
l i a b i l i t y  fo r  dolus and l i a b i l i t y  fo r custodia  existed in 
the f ie ld  o f contractual and quasi-contractual respons ib il i ty .
L iab ility  for auaWAz was imposed on borrowers "and, further- 
more, on those who, l ike  the launderer { fu l lo )  and the mender 
of garments {saraincttov), received things to be worked upon, 
the ship-master, innkeeper and stable-keeper (naufa, caupo e t 
etabw&artws), the lessor of a warehouse, the inspector who, 
in his own in te res t, received things fo r examination, 
presumably also the vendor before delivery, the lessee o f  a 
thing, the partner who had to work upon things belonging to 
other partners, and perhaps also the pledge-creditor."
71, Q’p a i t  § I I I  4.
72, Ib id , See also D 12 ,1 ,5 ,
73, S 36 I I I  4. See also % JoWoM d Co
AD 262, explaining Innes CD in Mac D uff Co {L iqu idator 
o f)  v Johann#sburff Consolidal&d Investmsnt Co. > 1924 AD 
573 and Pothier Tnatte ObZigattoMa 3 6 3 para 625
74, Kaser op a i t  § 36 I I I  4.
75, fb td  9 36 I I I  5,
76, lo id  § 36 I I I  3, See also Benohr op o-ft 89-90,
i. , . r—....... . . I,.!,,,***" '{.i. mi —
21.
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condictiones, ths debtor was9 according to K ^er, l iab le
only in the case of dolus.
According to the examples given in  the Code, the classical 
ju r is ts  seem to have assumed a l i a b i l i t y  i f  the debtor had 
made performance impossible by his intentional act (fac&ve) 
or i f  he had knowingly delayed the possible performance.
But i t  was l ia b il ity  for ab W  in an objective sense, in 
that conduct was construed as intended i f ,  fo r example, the 
debtor had acted in ignorance of his obligation, and even i f  
he could not have acted otherwise under the circumstances.
In isolated cases l i a b i l i t y  was extended to aulpa , but th is 
was probably c la s s ic a lb e c a u s e  in earlier times only 
l i a b i l i t y  for dolus and l i a b i l i t y  for oustodia  existed in 
the f ie ld  o f contractual and quasi-contractual respons ib ility .
L ia b i l i ty  fo r oustodia, was imposed on borrowers "and, fu rthe r­
more, on those who, l ike  the launderer ( fu l lo )  and the mender 
of garments (sara inatox'), received things to be worked upon, 
the ship-master, innkeeper and stable-keeper (nauta* oaupo &t 
etabu&zrtka), the lessor of a warehouse, the inspector who, 
in his own in te res t, received things for examination, 
presumably also the vendor before delivery, the lessee of a 
thing, the partner who had to work upon things belonging to 
other partners, and perhaps also the pledge-creditor."
71. op o i l  I  I I I  4.
72. Ib tJ , See also # 12.1 .5 ,
73. fb td  6 36 I I I  4, See also Abenfp w Jc W m  4 Co 1935
AD 262, explaining Innes CJ in MaaDuff Co { liq u id a to r  
o f)  v Jonanmaburg Consolidat&d Investment Co. , 1924 AD 
573 and Pothier T ra ite  dss Obligations 3 6 3 para 625,
74. Kaser op o i l  I 36 I I I  4.
75. fb td  5 36 I I I  5,
76. Ib id  § 36 I I I  3, See also Benohr op a i t  89-90.
O rig ina lly  l i a b i l i t y  for oustodia was absolute, because, in 
practice, damage was occasioned generally as the resu lt o f 
defective care in  guarding the thing, and thus o f negligence. 
"Only certain typical situations of innocence were excluded; 
the following have been transmitted to us: f i r e ,  shipwreck, 
inundation, collapse of a bu ild ing, earthquake, r io t ,  p illage 
by the enemy and gangs o f robbers, also the natural death of
7 0
a slave or animal." As Kaser points out, the classical 
ju r is ts  may have found ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r the l i a b i l i t y  in the 
express or ta c i t  assumption of a warranty to care fo r  or guard 
the thing e ffe c t ive ly .^9 " L ia b i l i t y  fo r damage occasioned by 
animals . , . and fo r  the escape of slaves who had to be 
guarded . . .  was included in o u s tod ia -]1abi1i t y .
I t  was a controversial point among the classical ju r is ts
whether l i a b i l i t y  also lay in  the case where damage was
81occasioned to the res by a th ird  party. "Where a debtor had 
to expose a thing to perils under a contract (e.g. in  carriage 
o f goods by sea , . . th is  kind o f l i a b i l i t y  was excluded."'
77. Kaser op a i t  § 36 I I I  3. See also Benohr op a i t  89 
and Windscheid op a i t  264 n 9,
78. Kaser loa a i t ,
79. Ib id . See also Windscheid op a i t  264 n 9, where he 
points out tha t the custodian was liab le  except in cases 
o f damnm f a t a l * * v is  major or casus oui r s s ie t i  non 
p o tm t.
80. Kaser loa a i t .
81. J'-dd, Naturally the debtor had to cede to the cred itor 
a l l  claims which he had against th ird  parties responsible 
for the loss (Pothier op a i t  3 6 4 para 635) including 
a l l  Insurance claims (Windscheid op a i t  264 n 6 rule 5).
82. Ib id .  And even where the damage or loss was 
deliberately occasioned by the carr ie r in such c i r ­
cumstances he could be excused, eg where he was forced 
to je tt iso n  cargo to save the ship and remaining cargo. 
Benohr op a i t  99 and 116.
■ ' ■;
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There were certain other instances of warranty where
l i a b i l i t y  arose irrespective of fa u lt ;  fo r example, where a
contractor or a partner was assumed to have warranted that he
had the necessary professional s k i l l  and, therefore, was held
83to be liab le  fo r  imp&vit'Ca.
The early l i a b i l i t y  fo r cb lm  hardened and extended into a 
l i a b i l i t y  fo r oul'pa in  the hona@ f id & i Q u d id a .^  "A fter 
an early post-classical t ra d it io n  one attempted to make up a 
clumsy and incomplete scheme o f the standards o f l i a b i l i t y  
by assuming that the party who was not interested in the 
legal relationship, was liab le  fo r  dolus only, whereas the 
party who was so interested was to be l ia b le  fo r bulipa as 
well (so-called 'p r inc ip le  of u t i l i t y 1 . . . ) " , except in the 
case of the mWczAzHwa, the W w r  and the greetor,
who were also liab le  fo r  G u lp a ,^  The question arises whether 
the fa u lt  o f  which the promisor was g u il ty  and which brought 
abort the im poss ib il ity  of performance could l ie  in  an act 
of omission as well as one o f commission.
The answer given by Mayer-Maly is  "yes". "Only an obligation  
directed at fw e re  [however] can be continued in  existence
through omissive oulpa" ( in  addition to commissive outpa).
I t  appears that an opinion which regarded omissive culpa as 
founding l i a b i l i t y  in a wider f ie ld  did not p re va i l ,87 
Following Kre lle r, Mayer-Maly is  also o f  the opinion that 
cw&pa was regarded ob jectively  as being "an offence 
against that which is necessary in  aonaveto fo r fu lf i lm en t
83, fK d ,
84, Idbm 5 36 I I I  5,
85, Xdm 1 36 I I I  5.
86, op o i t  9.
87, Ib id .  See also supra,
of the o b l ig a t io n " ,^  thus indicating the influence of the
concept of bona fid&s on the development o f the notion of
culpa.
In the bona® fib ts i ju d io ia  the cred ito r was, in addition to
an award fo r  his m tem sse , "indemnified fo r  a ll other losses
which resulted from the debtor's breach of his duty under
89the concrete obligation to show good fa ith  and care",
In the Eastern Roman Empire the concept o f oulpa was s t i l l
further developed under the influence of Greek philosophy
and C hris tian ity  in to a tendency to base a l l  l i a b i l i t y  on
fa u lt  (although i t  must be admitted that the f i r s t  glimmerings
of the notion appear in classical t im e s ) ,^  The general norm
then was that a debtor was liab le  fo r  dolus and oulpa » both
of which acquired a new meaning in that they were taken to
imply an element o f moral blameworthiness, which did not
permit too r ig id  a c lass if ica tion , but required an individual
91assessment in each part icu la r case.
"In dohis the element of malice came to the fore.
Culpa now comprised any blameworthy behaviour, especially the 
unintentional fa u l t ,  negligence, irrespective of whether i t  
manifested i t s e l f  in  positive acting or in an omission. This 
purely subjective oulpa included a dereliction o f duty; a 
general duty of care (d il ig e n tia )  was on the debtor, the 
culpable disregard o f which constituted carelessness 
{m g lig m t ia )  This la t te r  was tantamount to oulpa and
88, IH d  13,
89, Kaser op a i t  I  37 I 3 b.
90, fdhm § 36 IV 1,
91, Windscheid op c i t  264 n 9,
92, Kaser op a i t  § 36 IV 1,
the very opposite of Despite the fact that a
r ig id  c la ss if ica tion  was not possible, there remained a 
gradation of standards, frequently based on trad it iona l 
d is t in c t io n s ,94 which b r ie f ly  were:
(a) Utmost care (exactisa-ima d ilig® n tia .) ■> mainly imposed on 
those who in classical law had been liable for cwatodKa; 
they bore the stric test l ia b il ity  and were responsible
fo r even the s ligh tes t degree o f  negligence,
(b,' The ordinary princ ip le  of l i a b i l i t y  fo r both dolus 
and oulya. applied, the la tter being measured by the 
well-known standard of the ddtigawa 
c r ite r io n  obviously derived from Greek philosophy,
(c) A lower standard, which was often imposed, viz
d i l ig m t ia  quam sufs rshua adhibers so l& t (the so-
called l i a b i l i t y  for oulpa in  eonoreto)', sometimes
Justinian construed this standard as a duty of the utmost
care, but that is not pa rt icu la r ly  relevant for my 
97purposes here,
(d) The lowest contractual responsib ility  was l i a b i l i t y  fo r  
oulpa la ta  (nim ia m g lig m t ia )  or gross negligence, 
although i t  was said %ata db&o aggwfparatur,
was retained only fo r d e lic t ,
But even i f  there was onlp>a so that the obligation was 
perpetuated, the promisor could be freed of his l i a b i l i t y  i f  
a larger overlapping accidental damage had been occasioned to
93, J&td,
94, Zdkm § 36 IV 2,
95, Idem § 36 IV 2a,
96, Idem § 36 IV 2b,
97, idem 3 36 IV 2c,
98, I  36 IV 2d, 2e, See also, generally, Windscheid
op a i t  264 n 9.
the rea, provided that at that time the Promisor was not 
m o m This even applied to w il fu l  damage. Thus
Mayer-Maly points out that i f  a slave has been sold, and 
subsequently the seller sells the slavo again and delivers 
him to a third party, even th is  second dolo sale w i l l  not be 
sufficient to "annul the freeing effect of the death of the 
sieve"."l01 He points out, however, that neither Plautius 
nor Paulus "nor the formulation of the by the
we&arta laid claim to the correctness of all the logical 
consequences" of the rule, "but concentrated instead only on 
the general ru le " J ^
also applied where the impossibility of performance 
arose a f t * *  the debtor was in  mom. The rule provided that 
i f  par dk&ttorem gwo mtnws dbret (1e i f  the destruction
o f the thing was due to the debtor's fa u lt  or i f  i t  took 
place after the debtor was in  mom), the performance m s  was 
notional!y kept alive u n t i l  l i t i s  oont&statio,
Perm"ce103 emphatically states that culpable destruction of 
the obligation and mom had nothing in common, though c learly  
they would appear to be logically related, for were i t  not 
fo r the debtor's neglect to perform u  obligation timeously 
the subject-matter of the contract might not have been 
destroyed. Furthermore, both found a place in the p,rp*twz*&,» 
though i t  is impossible to decide which occurred f i r s t .  
Mayer-Maly points out tha t the culpable destruction of an
99, Mayer-Maly op c i t  17 and see below p 26 fo r the e ffec t 
of m m ,
100, a # .
101, J&I# (my tra n s la tio n ),
102, Akm 17-18 (my tra n s la tio n ),
103, Labeo 22 133, referred to by Mayer-Maly op c t t  18,
104, Mayer-Maly op a i t  18,
27.
obligation is non-remediable, whereas mara, on the other 
hand, is considered by some to be remediable; he goes on to 
say that m m  came to be regarded as a failure in performance 
because of the "indisputable, log ica l,  legal rea lization 
that late performance is only a substitute for the performance 
owed".^ 5
The p&rpetiiatio o b lig a tio n is  was also us id to exclude mere 
temporary suspension of the duty to perform, In this way 
Roman law recognised something analogous to our present-day 
notion of temporary impossibility of performance. As 
Pasquale Voci108 points out, the problem of temporary 
impossibility of performance of a stipu la tion  had received 
close study by Paul us and Celsus. Paul us postulates two 
hypothetical cases:
( i ) Where A promises B a ship, which is la te r  destroyed.
The obligation starts  o f f  by being va lid , but is  la te r 
extinguished. The destruction, however, may not be 
f in a l ;  fo r example, i t  may be possible to repair the 
ship, Paulus says i f  i t  is reconstructed of the same 
materials o f which i t  was previously made, i t  reaccydres 
i ts  orig inal id e n tity , The im possib ility  is terminated 
and the obligation o f the a tip u la U a  revives; the 
obligation was temporarily impossible of performance and 
the s t ip u la t io  merely temporarily inva lid . But i f  the 
ship is reconstructed according to a d iffe re n t design 
(or, presumably, even i f  i t  is  reconstructed to the same
Following K Wolff GmaidniBa dee §sv&mHoh»& Bit^gsrliahBs 
(1948); see Mayer-Maly op 18,
Medicus op c i t  86-7,
Idem 87,
he ohb ligax ion i Romani (aoreo d i Paulette) i t  oontemito 
o&Zwatfo I 1 (Milan 1969) (Preataai,** poseibtt,)
130,
105,
106,
107,
108,
v, -fir;*"'1'.' ■J:’^ ',:- - ■ , . .................... ,«.*.■• V^f.;-.. -,#.. - u a . - . ^ v y ! ‘- -/ ;./.'.-'-r.’;,'>. -'- "*•..  ...   '• .<* .yi'-w) •!■',
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design but of d if fe ren t m ateria ls^^) i t  becomes a 
d if fe ren t ship, and the obligation w i l l  not revive 
but w i l l  be regarded as having been f in a l ly  extinguished, 
jus t as i t  would i f  the ship cannot be reconstructed.
( i i ) Where a promised slave was captured by the enemy_or 
escaped from his master before de live ry . The o b l i ­
gation was not n u l l i f ie d ,  but action to compel delivery 
of him could be taken only when the slave had been 
recaptured ( I t  must be admitted, however, that 
the words val@v& mnption&m &t s t ip u la t io n ^  can also 
mean that before repossession o f the slave i t  was 
possible to sue successfully fo r his value, )
Celsus posed two further hypothetical cases:
( i ) Where a thing is promised which la te r becomes esitm 
aonrneraium, or a slave is promised who la te r becomes _a 
freeman, i n each case the promisor not being 
responsible fo r  the change in s ta tus. In both these 
cases the obligation was extinguished but reappeared 
i f  the thing la te r became negotiable or the freeman 
once more became a slave. No mention is  made of the 
length o f the period of im possib il ity ; hence, pre­
sumably, the Romans, unlike ourselves,11 did not 
regard a period of temporary im possib ility  as 
permanently inva lidating  the contract a fte r  a reasonable 
period had elapsed, even i f  the inh ib it ing  factors 
were subsequently removed.
109, See the in teresting  p a ra lle l case referred to in  
Schorer's note to Srotius 1 In U id in g  to t  d§ Uollandsom
1 ,3 ,47 ,1  (Maasdorp's translation  2d
ad Cape Town 1888),
110, See also Medicus op a i t  87-90, Temporary im poss ib il ity  
also applied to cases of oawearwm. See
Medicus op o-it 77, See also Benohr op a tt 72-3,
111, Medicus op a i t  89.
112, See eg B&r&tta v Bhodssia Railways L td  1947 2 SA 
1075 (SR) 1082 and see Chap 7 (pp 163ff) below,
( i i ) Where a piece of land is promised on which la te r  and
before transfer to the promisee a building "s erected.
Celsus says that in such circumstances the ob ligation
is extinguished, but that i f  the building is destroyed
the obligation would revive. As might be expected,
Paul us disagrees with th is conclusion, but maintains
there is re la tive  im possib il ity  o f performance in th is  
113case.
A  s im ila r sort of suspension, but not extinction , of the 
obligation arose in the case of vadimonim, a kind of 
recognisance entered into by a litig an t tc secure his due
appearance at the hearing of the case. I f  the promisor was
absent owing to his wife's pregnancy or to his presence at
a re la t ive 's  funera l, his promised payment was not exacted
but was held in  suspense against his appearance in due course.
(b) Performance must be objectively impossible
First, performance had to be substantially impossible. As 
Medicus^S says, "nullity does not apply i f  the disturbed
transaction remains performable with reasonable changes
Secondly, the obligation had to be wholly impossible of 
performance. I f  i t  was merely partia lly  impossible, the 
obligation was not extinguished, and the promisor had to
perform what he could of the obligation and cimpel ate the 
promisee for what he could not perform."116 The obligation
113, See Voci op 130, A reference to the texts, viz
p 32.79.2,3 and 0 46,3,98,8, does not seam to support
the conclusion in its entirety,
114, Kaser op o i t  I  36 IV 2d,
115, op o i t  92.
116, Pothier op e it  3 6 2 para 623 and 3 6 4 para 634; but
see Windscheid op o i t  264 n 2 ruies 6 and 8, See also
below p 150f, where the matter raised here ie dealt
with in  more d e ta i l .
„,,ki not be wholly impv -ib l- ui performance, however, where
; i ; the obligation related to a gems or an indeterminate 
rea, ie a ras not particularly specified;
( 11) the obligation consisted of alternative performances,
only one of which had become impossible of fulfilm ent,
as the remaining alternative simply became the 
118promise due; or
. i i i) in consequence of the circumstances which made the
performance Impossible, the promisor received compen­
sation or at least a right to compensation for loss of 
the thing due, for here the promisee could demand the 
compensation received by him or cession of the right 
l.o demand i t . ^ "
Thirdly, mere d ifficu lty  of performance or personal Incapa- 
b i l i t y  of the debtor*^  was in su ff ic ie n t.  In faaev® 
obligations the d is tinc tion  between im possib il ity  and mere 
personal incapability was lost in cases where the person of 
the debtor was Important, that 1s, 1n modern legal terms, in 
.ases which require the performance of highly personal duties, 
and the promisor was absolved, for example, where a portrait 
painter had been accidentally blinded, On the other hand, 
performance was considered impossible i f  i t  could be done only 
by exceptional effort or by the employment of very extra­
ordinary resources or i f  1t  was within the power of only a
117. Pothler op c tt 3 6 2 para 622; Wlndscheid op o it 264 n 2 
rule 7,
118. Pothler op c i t  3 6 2 para 62,,
I IS,  fbid 3 6 4 para 635; Wlndscheid op 264 n 2 rule 5,
120. Which cannot always be clearly separated, see Medicus 
op c i t  85.
121. fdem 100; Wlndscheid op ctt 264 n I
30.
would not be wholly impossible of performance, however, where
( i )  the obligation related to a eanws or an indeterminate
resj ie  a res not pa rt icu la r ly  .pacified,
(11) the obligation consisted of alternative performances,
only one of which had become impossible of fu lf i lm e n t,  
as the remaining alternative simply became the 
118 promise due; or
(111) in consequence of the circumstances which made the
performance impossible, the promisor received compen-
sation or at least a r ig h t  to compensation for loss of 
the thing due, for here the promisee could demand the 
ompensation received by him or cession of the r ig h t  
119 to demand i t .
hirdly, mere d ifficu lty  of performance or personal incapa­
b il i ty  of the debtorTZO insufficient.' In facer*
obligations the d is tinc tion  between im possib ility  and mere 
personal incapability was lost in cases where the person of 
the debtor was important, that is , in modern legal terms, in 
cases which require the performance of highly personal duties, 
and the promisor was absolved, for example, where a pc-tra it 
painter had been accidentally blinded, On the other hand, 
performance was considered impossible i f  i t  could be done only 
by exceptional effort or by the employment of very extra- 
ordinary resources or i f  i t  was w ith in  che power of only «
117. Pothier op a i t  3 6 2 para 622; Windscheid op c i '  264
rule 7,
118. Pothier op o i t  3 6 2 para 621 .
119. ibid 3 6 4 para 635; Windscheid op " i t  264 ' ' v
120. which cannot always be c learly separated. see Medicu
op c i t  85,
121. Idem 100; Windscheid op o i t  264 n 1,
19 9 MtirH rii<$ nn f . i t  84.
31 .
123
few exceptional persons.
While in general a promise was e ffective despite the 
incapacity of the d e b t o r , t h e r e  were exceptional cases,
One such exceptional case was that of the promise of a 
ftdstoommdsawm of a foreign res. i t  seems, an
implied condition may have applied L that the promise is
e ffective only i f  the foreign res can be procured. The reason 
advanced by Medicus for the exception is that the 
fWocmmaewm was actionable in the
fo r which a aond&wwztio in  ipsam r@m had to be given. I t  
is clear, therefore, that Rebel's opinion that the Romans took 
account only of objective impossibility of performance is
subject to some qua lif ica tion ,
I t  has been shown that i f  the r*e were carried away by the 
enemy, performance would be regarded as impossible, fo r  i t  
seems that the Romans were realis tic  enough to disregard the 
possibility of performance by the hoat** themselves, On
p C von Savigny System des heut%gen romsohm Rmnta 
III 16S, See also Windscheid op o t* 264 2b 4.
124. Medicus op o i t  84.
125. Ib fd .
126. See below p 34,
127. j  op o i t  85,
^S l^ll^Jhl^e'thS'duS^^SS'^erfo^S, was\l%rarily"^
suspendeds see above at 27f .
-
tion , , , , The texts do not give other instances^of
th is  rule than destruction of subject matter . . .  i 
but this clearly appears to be incorrect,
32.
the other hand, i t  afforded no excuse to the promisor, fo r  
e x a m p l e ,  that the promised res was owned by another who refused^ 
to part with i t j ^  or that i t  had been lost to him by theft, 
for s tr ic tly  spewing these circumstances ware not regarded 
as constituting im possib ility ,!^  as performance could 
ob jectively be achieved, though probably not by him.
As has been seen, however, temporary impossibility would 
excuse a delay in performance, and i t  is probable also that 
under the Roman law d ifficu lty  in performance might also in
certain circumstances excuse delay. Certainly from the days
of the post-glossators the maxim Mow
a.d a moro" was enunciated, and after the
Middle Ages applied even to money debts, This maxim
developed out of the Accursian Gloss on 5 45.1.137.4, where
im possib il ity  is  c learly  contrasted with mere d i f f ic u l t y  of
p e r f o r m a n c e . This clear distinction, however,^did not
correctly re f le c t  the true position in Roman law, as has
been shown, and came to have a less precise meaning and
significance in medieval times.
130, Medicus op a i t  101,
131, t. i t  100.
132, op a i t  101,
133, Feenstra op a i t  501.
134, Idem 498; M Meijers Etudes d 'h is to r ie  du d ro it  Voi IX, 27,
n T * r W o r ^ t * %  g y b ;
o f the duty of performance i f  he cannot perform or is
261 n 1
Voci op o i t  125f and D 45,1.137,5,
136, See below re the clausula rebus s ic  stantibus* at pp
KA and fifi
33.
There was another case of im possib il ity  that fa iled  to 
excuse the promisor and which must be mentioned here. This 
occurred where the promised res perished as a resu lt of 
la te n t defects existing  w ith in  i t  at the date the eantract 
was entered i n t o j ^  unless the contract excluded l i a b i l i t y  
fo r la te n t defects, as in the case of a w e W o o ta  sale,
The post-classical ju r is ts ,  including Justinian, did not  ^ ^
d ire c t ly  add anything to the rules re la ting to im poss ib il ity . 
Although, as we have seen, they developed the concept of 
boMa f& b a  and the rules re la t.n g  to i t  is sur-
pris ing that the changes in legal procedure, more pa rt icu la r ly  
the enforcement of specific performance, had no e ffect 
whatever on •impo$s%%ta& or octsus. The Romans did not work 
out any rules providing fo r an unsuccessful claim fo r  primary 
performance to be supplemented by a successful secondary
claim ,
Likewise, although pevpetucrtio o h lig a tio n is  f e l l  in to disuse 
the old rules o f aaaw* applied to  the f & W  contracts 
in  much the same way as they had in the a t r io t i  jw rta  
subject only to the growing sense of ayMwtZagms, o f Go** 
fk b a  and o f As Riccobono points out:
137. Benohr op a t*  90. Sea also Pothier op 3 6 1 para 
613 n.
138. Medicus op a i t  104.
139. A M ,  The RomanrDutch j u r i e s ,  however, to o k .it  in to
account: see Van Leeuwen Be* Boom oh Ho I  Icnids one Re on t  
12 ed revised and with notes by C W Decker 1780-3) 
(tran s la tio n  by J G Kotze sub nom Cb*m**tari*a on # **  
a&man-Cbtak Aow (London 1882-6)) 243,
140. Kaser op a i t  § 37 1 2,
141 Salvatore Riccobono S tipu la tion and the Theovy o f
CoMtroot (trans la tion  by J Karr Wylie (1957)
(Amsterdam and Cape Town) 174.
142, See D 45,1,35,2; 44.7,48.
143, Sea 0 45,4,14; 45,1,137,5.
144 Buckland "Ckaws and Frustration in Roman and Common Law" op e ft  
1283, 1286,
"Frequently the compilers adapted passages, which o r ig in a l ly  
referred to stipulation, so as to apply them to amptto and 
substituted the word 'obttgetto' for
and treated the stipulation as a written 
agreement. That the Byzantine emperors understood the form 
and substance of the stipulation in  the la t te r  sense is 
apparent from C 4.30.13., , , With this as its  meaning the 
term stipulciirCo passed in to modern language.
B, Roman-Dutch Law
This process was completed by the institutional writers on owd 
PWektenreaht, for example, "contains what is substantially 
only one system of contract , . , fZdbt notions have
prac t ica l ly  ousted those of e trioU m  jus" and the "system
of contract laid down by Pothier was unitary and fused the
notion of release by oasus with respect to s t r i e t i  jwpis
obligations with the law of sale , , . , He took the rules
he preferred from both systems to create what seemed t^o him 
to be a more ideal exposition of the law o f sale. The 
same is generally true of the other institutional^writers 
and even of the classical treatises on Scots law.
The position in Roman-Dutch law, then, seems to have been 
very similar to that which obtained in the developed Roman law, 
Supervening impossibility of performance arose i f ,  after the 
contract had been entered into but before performance had been
.
e
145, Jd*m 1288,
146, 1293,
147, Id m  1284,
-  % A ........-
35,
made, 1 ^g
(a) the subject-matter of the contract was destroyed,^ 
spo ilt  or lo s t , 150 s r  lecame exrtra mmsv&ww  or 
was expropriated;
(b) the object of the performance ceased to be capable of 
accepting performance, fo r  example, A promised to procure 
B a r ig h t  o f way to B's land over an adjoining f ie ld ,  
but B sells his land without transferring the benefit of
H3
the contract;
(c) dum luom tivaa  oaascm obtained;15^ this applied only 
where
155( i )  both contracts were lucra tive ; and
( i i )  the rights actually acquired under one lucrative
contract were at least as extensive as those promised 
under the other, otherwise the obligation remained 
under the la t te r  contract to make up the d e f ic i t ;
(d) death or d isability  incapacitated a promisor from 
performing his obligations under the contract, for
148, Pothiar op 3 ,6 ,1 ,para 613; Van der Linden XaopmaM*
&mk>mk (translated by George T Mo rice (Cape Town 
1914)1 1.18,6; Huber gaikMdev##
(translated by Percival Gane) 3,42,7 and Grotius 
fMlKdKM? to t  <& golZdMKboA*
(translated by R W Lee (Oxford 1926)} 3,47.1,
149, Van der Linden op a i t  1.18,6,
150, Ib id  and Huber op a i t  3.42.7,
151, Pothier op o ft 2,6,1, para 614 and Groti us op oft
3,47.1, 4.
152, Pothier Zoo o f t ,
153, fd*m 3 .6 ,1 , para 615.
154, Idem 3 ,6 ,1 , para 616.
155, Idem 3,6,1. paras 618-19,
35,
made, 143
(a) th . subject-matter of the contract was destroyed,^
s p o i l t ^  or lo s t or bocam mr
was expropriated;’*
but B sells his land without transferring the benefit of
153the contract;
(c) t o  lucrative., eauea* obtained; 154 * 1.  applied only
where 155
( i)  both contracts were lucrative; and 
( 11) the rights actually acquired under one lucrative
contract were at least as extensive as those FW ised  
under the other, otherwise the obligation resBfflad^ 
under the la tter contract to make up the deficit-,
(d) death or d isability incapacitated a promisor from 
performing his obligations under the contract, for
149, Van der Linden op o it  1.18.5,
150, fb&Z and Huber op f i t  3 ,42 ,7 ,
151 Pothier op o<* 3 ,6 ,1 , para 614 and Grotlua op ^
3.47,1 , 4.
152, Pothier ‘Loo o i t ,
153, 3 -6 '1 - ^IS ,
154, Zdkm 3 ,6 ,1 , para 616.
155, Idem 3 ,6 ,1 , paras 618-19,
156, 3 ,6 .1 . para 617,
m s ^ s m s m §
............
36.
example, a p o r tra it  painter became blind
157
As regards (a);
( i )  Destruction was subjected to very much the same test 
as in Roman l a w J ^  The aommcbcA*
1,66 contains a reference to a case at Amsterdam 
where i t  was held that a surviving spouse could not 
claim under an antenuptial contract a mill which had 
been blown down by the wind and reconstructed, in 
part out of the old materials, on the grounds that i t  
had ceased to exist and something quite different had
been substituted in i t s  place. 159
( i i )  i f  the subject-matter of the contract was sp o il t ,
general rule appears to have been that the debtoMvas
not released, but had to perform what remained,
and i f  he was responsible fo r  the damage, :o compensate
the cred itor fo r the deficiency in performance;
but i f  the defic ient performance could be shown to be
o f no value to him, the cred itor could re jec t i t  and,
where the debtor was responsible, demand fu ll
162compensation from him.
1 5 7 , Supra. All the cases were very much in accord with 
Roman law.
158, Swpra,
159, Schorar's note to Grotius op a i t  3,47,1
160, Pothier op a i t  3.6,1 paras 624, 634, The examples given relate to sale, where the doctrine of risk would
reouire th is  anyway. See also Van der Linden op a i t  
1.18.6; Windschtid op a i t  264 n 2: " I f  the debtor is  not 
to blame, ha is free and only has to perform what 
remains possible of the obligation o r ig in a l ly  contracted 
fo r " ,  including any proceeds (such as insurance) received 
from the destroyed
161, Windscheid op a it  264 n 2, 6 , 8 , provided the right has 
al.e&dy vested at the time of the partial destruction 
(Puuiier op etc 3.6,1 para 634),
Windscheid op a i t  264 n 2, 6, 8,
37.
( i i i )  A d is tinc tion  was drawn between destruction and loss,
fo r a thing destroyed cannot be renewed, w h ils t i f  i t  
is merely lost, for Instance taken by robbers, i t  may 
be recovered and the debtor is only released w h ils t the 
loss con tinues;^3 hence temporary im possib ility  was 
also recognised, apparently s t i l l  without time l im i t .
Again, im possib il ity  did not release the debtor if^he was
responsible for i t ,  whether by a deliberate act, even i f
at the time he was unaware of the obligation, or by 
negligence,"166 the determination of which varied according 
to the d if fe ren t nature of contracts."16'7
The onus rested on the debtor to show that the subject-matter 
of the contract had not perished or been damaged as a resu lt
of his fault
I f  the debtor was in  mora at the time the subject-matter was 
destroyed or damaged, he was generally not released, unless 
the mora had been purged, by tender, waiver or release, or
he could show that i t  would have been destroyed or damaged
163, Pothier op c i t  3.6,1 para 620.
164, I b id  3,6,1 para 625; Windscheid 264 n 2,3 & 4; Grotius 
op o i t  3.47,1, & 2; Van Leeuwen op o i t  2,4,14,3; Huber
op a i t  3.42,7,
165, Pothi er op a i t  3.6,1,625.
166, Ib id  3.6,1 .626; Windscheid op o i t  264 n 2, 3 & 9s Van
der Linden op o i t  1,18,6; Van Leeuwen op o t t  2,4,14,3,
167, Pothi er op a i t  3 ,6 ,1.626.
168, op a i t  3,6,1.620 ,
169, op a i t  3,6,1,627; Grotius op a i t  3.47.1 , 3; Huber
op a i t  3.42.7,
170, Pothier op a i t  3,6,1,627,
anyway, even i f  delivered in t im e J ^  unless the cred itor 
would have resold i t  and so passed on the r is k .  These 
rules do not appear to be restricted to the doctrine o f r is k ,  
but to be generally applicable to supervening im poss ib il ity  
of performance, though the in s ti tu t ion a l writers make no 
attempt to distinguish between the two doctrines, I f  the 
debtor’s l i a b i l i t y  arose from fraud ^  violence, fo r example, 
he had fo rce fu lly  dispossessed the cred itor of the res, i t  
did not avail him to show that i t  would equally have perished^ 
in the cred ito r 's  possession•, he was held absolutely l ia b le .
In a l l  such cases where the debtor was not released by the 
supervening im poss ib il ity , he was obliged to pay the cred itor 
damages and in terest,*174Wi-ndscheid, however, says that i f  the 
performance is possible but only with disproportionate 
sacrif ices, the debtor would be liab le  only for the true 
value of the res, but not in te re s t ,175 though often in such 
circumstances the extreme d i f f ic u l t y  of performance releases 
the debtor.175
Where the l i a b i l i t y  existed, i t  was transmissible to the 
debtor's h e irs ,177 and sureties for the original obligation1 yo
were liab le  fo r  the substituted obligation,
171, Ib id  and Huber op a i t  3,42.7,
172, Pothier op a i t  3,6,1,627.
173, Ib id  and Huber op a i t  3,42.7,
174, Van der Linden op a i t  1.18.6,
175, op a i t  § 264 n 2 (b ) ,
176, op a i t  ! 264,2,4, and see above pp 30-1.
1 7 7 ,  Pothier op a i t  3.6,1,§629,
178, Ib id  and Van der Linden op o it  1,18.6; fo r the position 
where the surety, a co-debtor or a co-heir was guilty of 
fa u lt  or rora, see Pothier op o i t  3.6,1 para 630, 1 & 2 
respect!vely,
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